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A Significant Factor in Germany’s Defeat in 
World War I 
J O S E P H  Z E L L E R
Abstract : More than a hundred years have passed since the outbreak of the 
World War I, but there are still fundamental gaps in our understanding 
of the conflict. It has been generally recognized that the British blockade 
of Germany played the central role in bringing about Germany’s 
surrender. The German economy, industry and military came to suffer 
as a result of domestic shortages of all kinds, but especially of coal. In 
the gridlock of devastation and military force that had developed by 
1916 coal came to represent a most effective tool of British allied force 
that Germany could not counter and so became a decisive factor in 
Germany’s collapse by 1918.
More than one hundred years have passed since the outbreak of the World War I, but there are still fundamental gaps in our 
understanding of the conflict. It has been generally recognised that 
the British blockade of Germany played the central role in bringing 
about Germany’s defeat. However, modern histories of the blockade 
are often preoccupied with the naval elements of Britain’s blockading 
efforts. Attention must also be given to the commercial system of 
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shipping control that contributed to the tangible and quantifiable 
results affecting Germany’s defeat.1
This paper asserts that Germany was defeated, not only because 
of losses on the battlefield, but because the British blockade weakened 
the nation to the point where it could no longer fight. Coal fueled 
that blockade. Coal control by Britain further harmed Germany 
domestically, even as its redirection and leverage strengthened the 
British war effort.
As the blockade progressed, German military planning and its 
economic and industrial affairs became increasingly defined by lack 
of international access and domestic shortages of all kinds, including 
coal. In the gridlock of devastation and military force that developed 
by 1916, coal came to represent the one effective tool of the British 
allied forces that Germany were unable to counter. Thus, coal became 
one of the most decisive, war-ending assets used to defeat Germany 
in 1918.
This article traces the impact that British coal-born commercial 
dominance had on German military affairs before exploring the 
implications that system had on wartime maritime affairs. It then 
examines the domestic cost of the blockade on Germany. Overall, 
the result of the British blockade was much as Julian Corbett had 
anticipated it would be three years prior to the war in 1911:
By closing his [Germany’s] commercial ports we exercise the highest 
power of injuring him which the command of the sea can give us. We 
choke the flow of his national activity afloat in the same way that 
military occupation of his territory chokes it ashore. He must, therefore, 
either tamely submit to the worst which a naval defeat can inflict upon 
him, or he must fight to release himself[...]In the long run a rigorous and 
uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts 
us, but the end will be far and costly.2
1  This article follows the 2015 publication, Joseph Zeller, “British Maritime Coal 
and Commercial Control in the First World War: Far More Than Mere Blockade,” 
Canadian Military History 24, 2 (2015) It continues from the British blockade 
infrastructure previously established and goes on to explore the impact of that 
system on Germany over the course of World War I. It incorporates additional 
material based, in part, on the author’s completed doctoral dissertation: Joseph 
Zeller, Control of Coal: The key to power in the Age of Steam (University of New 
Brunswick, 2016)
2  Julian Stafford Sir Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 
2004), 187. 
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german military affairs
From the German perspective, World War I began on 1 August, 1914 
with Germany’s declaration of war on Russia.3 This declaration of 
war represented the culmination of decades of military preparation 
and enormous investment on the part of the German government, 
and it was a decision strongly supported by the vast majority of 
German citizens at  the time. Germany had, after all, been unified, 
in no small measure, by the military endeavors of the Prussian army. 
The continued application of military force since that time had 
successfully increased Germany’s territories and global prominence. 
For Germany, war was good; and Germany, in turn, was very good 
at war.4
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, the German army was 
arguably the most powerful and well-equipped military force in 
the world.5 It also outnumbered its enemies on the battlefield. A 
quick mobilisation plan, foreknowledge of the conflict, and a highly 
developed and exceptionally efficient transportation network saw 
approximately 1.5 million (1,485,000)6 German soldiers successfully 
advance into foreign soil against a French force of about two thirds 
its size (1,071,000)7 as well as  hastily assembled British and Belgian 
forces, each less than one-tenth of Germany’s army.8 This state of 
affairs was hardly surprising since Germany was the most populous, 
industrialised and prosperous nation in Western Europe. Germany 
could mobilise more men and materials towards its war effort using 
its large reserves of money and material to fight harder and longer 
than any of its rivals—at least on paper.
To Germany’s east, Russia could theoretically gather together a 
far larger army from among its massive population and vast territory, 
3  Hew Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 24. 
4  Alekseĭ Alekseevich Brusilov,  A soldier’s notebook, 1914-1918 (London: Macmillan, 
1930), 1-3. 
5  Theodore Ropp and Alex Roland,  War in the modern world (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 241; J.R. Hill and Bryan Ranft, The Oxford 
Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
29; and Arthur Banks and Alan Palmer, A Military Atlas of the First World War 
(London: Heinemann Educational, 1975), 4.  
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but it lacked the industry or transportation system to equip those 
soldiers or bring them together in a timely and effective manner. 
To Germany’s west, there seemed to be no reason why Germany’s 
overwhelming military might would not defeat the far weaker French 
forces before anyone else could intervene.
Judged by the usual metrics applied to military forces, the 
great mystery of World War I should be how the more powerful, 
better prepared, better trained and better equipped German army 
ever lost such a conflict. It is true that French resistance proved 
more determined than many had expected, resulting in Germany’s 
alliance having to fight an active war on two fronts for more than 
two years. However, that second front collapsed, along with the 
Russian Empire, more than a year before the war’s end. Even if one 
includes the massive number of Russian soldiers, Germany and its 
allies kept pace.
The German-aligned Central Powers mobilised approximately 25 
million soldiers during the hostilities, a number that was on par with 
the combined forces mobilised  on the European mainland from the 
forces of the Triple Entente  (Britain, France, and Russia). However, 
the additional fifteen million overseas troops available only to the 
Triple Entente offers a persuasive explanation for Germany’s decline 
and subsequent defeat. In a conflict infamous for its lack of decisive 
war-winning battlefield victories, it was the side best able to sustain 
the unrelenting need for ever more manpower and resources that was 
going to win.9 This meant people and supplies needed to traverse a 
sea; a British sea, fuelled by British coal and coaling stations.
germany and the high seas of commerce
Before the war, Germany attempted to preserve access to material 
relief abroad in several ways that eventually proved insufficient in 
overcoming Britain’s logistical control of international shipping. 
Germany championed the Declaration of London in 1909 in order to 
ensure  that the free-flow of commercial traffic was an absolute right 
9  R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: 
From 3500 B.C. To the Present (New York, Harper & Row: 1977), 990.
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guaranteed by international law. That  effort failed, as nations such 
as Great Britain chose not to ratify the proposed measure.10
Germany even constructed the second largest navy in the 
world, part of Germany’s decades-long heavy investment in wartime 
preparations—a force built to rival Britain’s while ushering in a new 
age of German ascendancy on the world stage. These ambitions also 
led to territorial acquisitions so that, by 1914, Germany controlled 
almost the entire Baltic Sea as well as numerous colonial holdings, 
including colonies in Africa, islands in the Pacific and territory in 
China.11 However, Germany knew its colonies would be swiftly overrun 
at the outbreak of war, and its naval units forced to scramble for 
survival. While Germany had only 180 ocean-going warships Britain 
had 313.12 Britain also had more well-developed communication 
systems to coordinate its naval affairs.13 In the end, affairs were much 
as the German Vice-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener later summarised 
in 1926 when he addressed the value of Britain’s geographic position 
and control of trade routes.
England found herself simply in a brilliant strategic position at the 
outbreak of the war. The arteries of her commerce lay in the Atlantic, 
unreachable by the German fleet from the Elbe. The German trade 
routes[…]could easily be severed in the Channel and off Scotland. The 
North Sea, through which no trade route any longer went, became a 
dead sea. The strategic position was so perfect that England never once 
felt the need to improve her position throughout the entire course of the 
war[...]the primary mission of the English fleet consisted of defense of 
England’s strategic position, from which she controlled the important 
commercial arteries in the Atlantic...14
Vice-Admiral Wolfgang went on to aptly explain how that position 
influenced British military strategy over the course of hostilities.
10  W. Arnold-Forster, The Blockade. 1914-1919 (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1939), 6.
11  Holger H. Herwig, ‘Luxury’ Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1980),  Appendix: Table 20.
12  Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (London: UCL Press, 1994), 
7-20.
13  Javier Ponce Marrero,  “Logistics for Commerce War in the Atlantic During the 
First World War: The German Etappe System in Action,” The Mariner’s Mirror 92, 
4 (2006): 455-64. 
14  Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (Classics of Sea Power) 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 14-15. 
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In the broadest sense, England was prepared to do battle as soon as 
her defensive mission required[…]Since this attack never materialized, 
England saw no reason to fight. One does not need to fight for the 
command of the seas that one possesses—and England possessed 
unrestricted command of the seas in the Atlantic—until that control is 
challenged. We did not make the slightest encroachment upon it. The 
British will to fight, the unavoidable precondition for a battle in the 
North Sea, thus did not exist...15
Germany’s attacks in 1914 took place within an increasingly more 
restrictive area of operation, as fewer neutral coaling stations 
became accessible to Germany as a base from which German ships 
could operate. Both Germany and Britain possessed warships able 
to voyage great distances, but only Britain could be sure of securing 
the fuel required to return. The importance of British coal served 
to constrain Germany’s formidable maritime assets, relegating the 
German warships to a benign role and swiftly driving German 
merchant shipping from the high seas.
Of all the advantages the British navy enjoyed on the eve of war, 
coal was the only one in which Germany was unable to compete.16
These British fuel-derived powers had widespread and direct 
ramifications of global significance as described by Lloyd George 
(than British Minister of Munitions) in 1915: “Coal is the most 
important element in the industrial life of this country. The blood 
which courses through the veins of industry in the country is made 
of distilled coal. In peace and in war King Coal is paramount Lord 
of Industry. It enters into every article of consumption and utility; 
it is our real international coinage. When we buy goods, food, and 
raw material abroad, we pay not in gold but in coal.”17 By 1913, 
coal made up more than 80 per cent of Britain’s exports by weight 
15  Ibid, 15. 
16  Rep 450 Mel, No. 732 Supply of fuel, timber, peat and coal 1916-1921, 
Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv-Staatsarchiv Osnabrück.
17  R. A. S. Sir b Redmayne, The British Coal-Mining Industry During the War 
(Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1923), 2. 
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and constituted a central facet of the economy allowing international 
commerce to function.18
Because of the central role British fuel and depots played in 
international commerce, German vessels and merchantmen found 
little comfort, even in supposedly neutral harbours. Of the roughly 
6,200,000 tons of shipping owned and operated by Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, almost one-half (about 2,875,000 tons) was interned 
in neutral ports during the first five months of war.19
Neutral countries were now supporting the British power they 
could not do without.20 All of Germany’s foreign-based warships 
were either destroyed or neutralised within a year of the war’s start. 
Each ship was seriously constrained by its inability to access coaling 
facilities. Many were destroyed while attempting to coal.21 Even the 
formidable German High Seas Fleet was kept bottled up in home 
waters, and not just by its British opponents, but by its inability to 
secure reliable bases or facilities anywhere else. Wegener described 
the situation:
Every war at sea revolves around freedom of the seas for one’s 
own shipping.
We lost this freedom through geographical position upon England’s 
declaration of war, for only he who by virtue of his geographical position 
controls the trade routes, obtains his freedom in time of war. The 
“Grand Fleet,” which deprived us of the freedom of the seas, brought us 
to our knees solely by maintaining its strategic geographical position.22
18  For more extensive coverage and context of  Britain’s sizable coal fuelled power of 
commercial dominance see: Joseph Zeller, “British Maritime Coal and Commercial 
Control in the First World War: Far More Than Mere Blockade,” Canadian Military 
History 24, 2 (2015): page range?; Isador Lubin, Helen Everett, and Institute of 
Economics, The British Coal Dilemma:  The Institute of Economics Investigation 
in Industry and Labor (New York: The Macmillan company, 1927), 25; Max E. 
Fletcher, “From Coal to Oil in British Shipping,” The Journal of Transport History 
3, 1 (1975), 6; and Charles Campbell McLeod and Adam Willis Kirkaldy, The Trade, 
Commerce, and Shipping of the Empire  (London: W. Collins Sons & Co., 1924), 
166-67. 
19  Louis Guichard and Christopher Rede Turner, The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918 
trans. By Christopher R.Turner (London: P. Allan & Co., 1930), 10. 
20  Ibid
21  E.B Potter, ed., Seapower: A Naval History ([S.l.]: Prentice Hall International, 
1960), 202-06. 
22  Ibid, 37. 
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Much has been said of Germany’s unrestricted submarine campaigns, 
but for this article it is enough to point out that they failed to 
provide any substantive relief of Germany’s supply issues. The 
German adoption of mass U-boat attacks served mainly to expend 
more resources abroad for very limited returns.23
The initial German plan in 1914 intended to sidestep the 
inevitability of Britain’s seaborne dominance and to attempt to swiftly 
conquer European enemy territory while doing enough damage to force 
a favorable diplomatic settlement before supplies became an issue. 
Germany’s  initial military activities reflected these goals. Germany 
mobilised its workforce to create an army as large as possible and 
then sent a sizable portion of that force through neutral Belgium to 
catch French forces off-guard and force the quick settlement to the 
conflict. However, Germany’s carefully crafted military plans did not 
achieve the desired decisive resolution.
Unlike Germany, Britain managed to carry out its military goals 
rather well. With the powerful logistical support provided by its coal 
and coal stations, the British navy swiftly secured its most important 
transportation hubs and stations from foreign interference, ensuring 
safe passage for as much commercial activity and Commonwealth 
support as could be arranged,  sweeping the seas of any rival forces and 
shipping. While not without incident or setbacks, Britain succeeded 
in achieving its primary objective of controlling international trade by 
the end of 1914, thus creating quite a problem for Germany. Britain’s 
control over transportation and supply channels became central to 
the war’s outcome because it not only permitted British supplies 
through but it also prevented German supplies from any access to 
those routes.
23  U-boats generally expended fuel and munitions in operations that destroyed 
shipping without securing any form of material benefit for Germany. There are two 
notable exceptions. First, two U-boat cargo vessels were created to evade British 
Blockade efforts and engage in trade with the United States, but after three voyages 
in total, in which one of the ships was lost, that idea was discarded. Second, Germany 
derived benefit from an indeterminate amount of shipping within the Baltic and 
North Sea that it confiscated, rather than destroyed, by surface vessels and U-boat 
operations during the war. However, the amount of such shipping appears to have 
been minimal, although exact figures have proven difficult to identify.
8
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germany and the mounting cost of coal
In 1918, Britain’s Government Committee on the Treatment by the 
Enemy of British Prisoners of War received a report of inhumane 
conditions and forced labour from prisoners of war in German mines. 
This account from Private John Devany described how soldiers “had 
driven picks into their feet”24 rather than continue to work such 
long hours with little food and in hazardous conditions as mines 
in increasing disrepair were dug deeper for less and less reward.25 
The report was corroborated by a compilation of similar reports 
submitted to the committee and the War Office in April of that 
year as part of an investigation by the committee’s secretary, Dame 
Adelaide Livingston.26
The mines were only one of many locations in which prisoners 
of war were being forced to work.27 The circumstances of their work, 
and the diminishing production towards which they contributed 
symbolised the state and degradation that Germany had undergone 
over the several years of Britain’s blockade. Their experiences also 
offer another window through  which the conditions in Germany can 
be viewed.. As one British Private, Ernest Evanson, reported:
When working in the mines I often spoke to the civilian labourers 
there about food conditions. It was their constant talk and they also 
complained of the dearness of things and the impossibility of getting 
clothes. They would buy even our prison clothes with the yellow stripes 
or our hats and they would pay anything for soap or boots. I got into 
touch with an Austrian who had been engaged in smuggling things in 
from Holland and I gave him some soap in exchange he gave me two 
shirts, two collars and two ties. I had already got two compasses and a 
map for which I had given soap. I bribed a Serbian Tailor to alter our 
24  Employment of British Prisoners in Coal and Salt Mines: File 60206, 3: Prisoners: 
Germany File 303 (P.P. 60203-82851) of War Reports FO 383/390 British National 
Archives.
25  Ibid, File 60948, 6; and File 60953, 2.
26  Ibid, File 60206, 1-5.
27  Prisoners: Germany File 303 (P.P. 60203-82851) of War Reports FO 383/390 
British National Archives in its entirety 
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prison clothes so as to hide the stripes and on the 23rd of February I and 
an Australian soldier got away[...]28
 Many reported along similar lines how Germany’s mines represented 
only one facet of the nation’s worsening circumstances and poor 
conditions for workers of all stripes.29 Although the use of forced 
labour was a practice shared by all the major powers involved in the 
conflict, the scale and poor treatment of this force within Germany 
is notable.30 The agricultural sector alone lost 60 per cent of its 
workforce to the German war effort.31 As these three million people 
left their work because of the war, up to 900,000 prisoners of war 
and 430,000 migrant workers imprisoned by the German government 
were forced to work the land in their stead.32 The mining industry 
was no different and at least 350,000 of those imprisoned in Germany 
were forced to work in industries, including mining, as Germany 
sought to meet its increasing demands with ever greater manpower.33 
The British blockade impacted Germany profoundly, affecting 
every aspect of day-to-day life, and the shortages created impacted 
the lives of every single person within its borders, not just the 
prisoners of war. In 1913, prior to war, Germany relied on foreign 
trade for more than 40 per cent of its gross national product.34 As the 
28  Report by Private Ernest Evanson: Treatment of British Prisoners in German 
Hands April 6, 1918: File 60948, 6: Prisoners: Germany File 303 (P.P. 60203-82851) 
of War Reports FO 383/390 British National Archives. Note: Prisoners were able 
to receive intermittent aid packages from their home government depending on 
circumstance and these aid packages could provide the soap, boots or even surplus 
food by which they could sometimes barter.
29  Ibid,  File 60953, 8. In which Canadian Private Horace Robinson reported much 
the same regarding unpleasant mining conditions and also how “There were German 
civilian’s working with us. We used to give them food, and we got compasses and files 
from them. On March 16th, 1918 I escaped...” These stories are also representative 
of the approximately two million forced labourers used within the German war effort 
(Isabel Hull, A scrap of paper: breaking and making international law during the 
Great War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 125.
30  Ibid, 70, 127-28. 
31  Avner Offer, The First World War:  an Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 27. 
32  Offer, The First World War:  an Agrarian Interpretation, 62. 
33  Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and 
to Austria-Hungary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 30. 
34  M. Vego, Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904-1914 (New York: Routledge, 
2013), 32.
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war progressed, this number fell to less than one-fifth of that original 
value, leaving an unfilled shortage of materials.35
Avner Offer’s The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation 
focuses on problems of food supply, heavily implicating the British 
blockade as a contributing factor in preventing any form of external 
relief to the peoples’ hardships.36 When discussing Germany’s policies, 
trade agreements, and agricultural efforts, Offer points out that, “It is 
wrong therefore to blame the German food crises on mismanagement 
alone. Blockade made them almost inevitable.”37 Offer had little 
difficulty in identifying the importance of raw materials, including 
coal, in the German war effort.  He noted Germany’s serious decline 
in coal production: “By the last year of the war the effective output 
per worker within many of Germany’s various industries, including 
coal mining, had dropped by 30 per cent to 40 per cent.”38
German industrial might was still based on coal and iron[...]With the 
growth of industrial strength and with the passing of the “iron age” of 
German industry, its entire structure became increasingly dependent on 
foreign raw materials. Imports of raw materials for manufacture and of 
semi-finished products amounted to 1,310,300,000 marks in 1887 and to 
5,882,600,000 marks in 1912, and their ratio to total imports (excluding 
gold and bullion) increased from 42 to 55 per cent.39
Prewar, Germany imported almost a quarter of its agricultural 
produce,40 having to make do with its own supplies as two-thirds of 
35  Offer, The First World War, an Agrarian Interpretation, 62. 
36  Ibid, 68.  
37  Ibid, 68. 
38  Ibid, 34. 
39  Ibid, 12. 
40  Grebler and Winkler’s 1940 work, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to 
Austria-Hungary,  quantifies this reliance on foreign imports as follows: “According 
to the German Reichsarchiv, average domestic production in the period 1903-1913 
varied between 75 and 80 per cent of total consumption of agricultural products while 
imports ranged between 20 and 25 per cent. The import share of dairy products was 
as high as 50 per cent, of eggs 33 per cent, of wheat 30-40 per cent, of barley 40-55 
per cent, of vegetable fats 85 per cent, of fish 65 per cent.” According to Skalweit,” 
three-fifths of the consumption of legumes were imported. Rice, tea, and coffee came, 
of course, entirely from abroad. Ninety-five per cent of all the meat consumed was 
supplied from domestic production, but about one-third of that production was 
dependent on imported fodder.” See, Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World 
War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9. 
11
Zeller: Coal
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
12 Coal
its agricultural workforce marched off to war.41 The mining industry 
was also hit hard, as the study Economic and Social History of 
the World War, commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in 1923, makes clear:
The need for men in the army was urgent; but urgent, too, was the 
need for men in the mines. There were at this time over 1,000,000 work-
people employed above and below ground at the collieries. Up to the end 
of March 1916 there had flocked, voluntarily, to the army 282,200 men, 
the very pick of the man power of the mining industry, and even when 
it was found necessary to take steps to prevent more men from leaving 
the mines, leakage continued.42
While Germany’s enemies were able to seek relief from internal 
shortages by importing goods from abroad, Germany could not. 
As the prominent naval writer, wartime British naval officer and 
eventual Baron, Stephen King-Hall wrote:
The blockade upon the peoples of the Central Powers was cumulative and 
widespread in its effects. It had a direct influence upon the efficiency of 
their military machine by cutting off the supplies of essential munitions 
of war, such as copper, tin, rubber, nickel, and cotton, and lowered the 
physical resistance and morale of the civil population by cutting off 
supplies of the necessities of life... which eventually caused even the 
well-disciplined and patriotic German people to turn in despair and lift 
the cup of defeat to their lips.43
Wartime impacts of the resulting shortages have been the subject 
of numerous studies, but among the most modern and extensive is 
Roger Chickering’s 2007 publication The Great War and Urban Life 
in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918. Although focused on the city of 
Freiburg, the study nonetheless provides an important perspective of 
wartime activities that underscores the mounting cost of blockade-
enforced isolation. Chickering describes the effect of the blockade:
41  Offer, The First World War, an Agrarian Interpretation, 62. 
42  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Economics and History, 
Economic and Social History of the World War. British Series (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1923), 257. 
43  Stephen, Baron, King-Hall, The War on Sea, 1914-1918 (London, 1929), 72. 
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The war strangled German agriculture. ‘Imports from abroad, on which 
the German food supply had to a great extent relied, were cut off by the 
blockade,’ as the economist August Skalweit summarized the dilemmas 
that he had faced as a leader in the central bureaucracy in Berlin. ‘An 
increase in Germany’s own agricultural production to compensate for 
these losses to even a small degree was impossible, because the effort 
would have claimed so many human and material resources that the 
country’s military power would have suffered.’[...]The crisis surfaced in 
shortages that became more debilitating the longer the war continued, 
albeit in various degrees of severity44
In order to supply its prewar needs, Germany had established the 
second largest merchant marine in the world with a combined tonnage 
of more than a quarter the size of Britain’s and 1,897 vessels of more 
than 100 tons. Germany  depended on these vessels for luxury items, 
fertilizer, animal feed, horses, industrial materials, food45 and, of 
course, coal.46 Chickering explains:
The combined shortages of food and fuel exacerbated urban misery 
during the final two years of the war. Oversight of the fuel supply 
was only a little less complex and critical to the city’s survival than 
the administration of foodstuffs. It compounded the regulatory burdens 
and increased the administrative costs, adding innumerable new 
complications to a bureaucratic enterprise that had taken on grotesque 
proportions.47
While Germany had many coal mines of its own, the demands of 
war quickly outstripped its internal capacity. Coal was needed by 
industry for manufacturing weapons of war, supporting troops and 
maintaining civilian infrastructure. Coal was also required to secure 
the needs of allies and the nations of Scandinavia, as described in a 
1916 British intelligence report:
44  Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 217. 
45  Offer, The First World War:  an Agrarian Interpretation, 62. 
46  Redmayne, The British Coal-Mining Industry During the War, 100. 
47  Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918, 226. 
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“coal is Germany’s principal weapon for compelling neutral nations to 
allow the export of many much-needed commodities. I have[…]referred 
to the large quantities of coal which find their way from Germany 
to Sweden, while Switzerland is known to be entirely dependent for 
her coal on the good-will of her powerful neighbour, imports of coal 
from Germany to Switzerland averaging well over 10,000 tons a day. 
Denmark is also now obliged to obtain a certain amount of coal from 
Germany.48
Coal was used to generate most of Germany’s electricity and fuel 
its diminishing trade and transportation network.49 Coal was also 
central to everyday life as a cooking fuel, a source of light and a 
central provider of heat in winter. Coal became central to Germany’s 
ability to sustain what little trade it still possessed with its allies and 
the nations of Scandinavia. By 1915, acute shortages of fuel were 
already causing massive transportation blockages nationwide as the 
need to move men and troops to the front left insufficient fuel for the 
movement of food, raw materials and, ironically, coal.50  Coal could 
not be moved because of the lack of coal and, indeed, in 1917, the 
construction of several coal mines in Belgium had to be abandoned, 
also because of lack of coal.51
The reason for this seeming absurdity was the existence of many 
different grades of coal, each used for a specific purpose. The lowest 
quality and most commonly available grades generated enough heat 
to cook food and heat homes but higher grades of coal were required 
to efficiently operate steam locomotion and were far less common. 
The highest grade, which generated enough heat to melt and process 
steel, was rarer still. If the right grade of fuel was unavailable, a lower 
48  The Economic Situation in Germany During June 1916, And being The 23rd 
Month of The War”. Mr. Max Müller, the British Consul-General in Budapest, 
to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst: British National Archives: CO 323/715, General 
1916, 102.
49  Ibid, 224. 
50  Caroline Ethel Cooper and Decie Denholm, Behind the lines: one woman’s war, 
1914-1918: the letters of Caroline Ethel Cooper (London: Jill Norman & Hobhouse, 
1982), 113. 
51  Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-
Hungary, 75. 
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grade might be substituted, although it worked far less efficiently and 
left behind far more residue.52
The “Turnip Winter of 1916” provides an excellent example of 
coal’s impact. The German people were hit with an unexpectedly 
bitter winter and massive shortages that brought about a nation-wide 
crisis. As its name suggests, relief from hunger was partly resolved by 
the widely available turnip.53 Relief from the cold was more difficult 
to come by. Without coal to heat their homes, almost all suffered, 
and thousands died. It was the first of many harbingers of defeat 
suffered by Germany’s civilian population. It was reported from 
British parliamentary investigations into the the war’s civilian cost of 
the time that the toll of war and blockade only became more tragic as 
the war progressed past 1917. By the end of that year the death rate 
of children between two and six years old increased 49 per cent and 
the death rate among older children increased 55 per cent.54 Those 
studies concluded:
that in November, 1916, the food distributed and obtainable per head 
in Germany had a calorific value of only 1,431 calories. The Inter-
Allied Scientific Food Commission had laid down that the minimum 
necessary to keep a population in health was 2,772 calories... during 
the “Turnip Winter” about 30,000,000 Germans were only able to keep 
alive by using up their own fat tissues, and their average loss of weight 
was from 15 to 25 per cent...In 1915 the increase in the civil death-
rate was 9 per cent.; in 1916 it was 14 per cent.; in 1917 it was 32 per 
cent[...]When faced with the failure of the submarine campaign at sea, 
and military defeat in the west, the exhausted German people finally 
collapsed, 750,000 civilians who, according to pre-war expectation of 
mortality statistics, should still have been alive in 1918.55
52  Wood and coke also provided viable methods of fuel production and were often 
substituted for coal, but the logistical complexities of supply and distribution 
remained substantial; Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: 
Freiburg, 1914-1918, 225-26. 
53  Guichard and Turner, The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918, 83. 
54  The postwar source refers to a 55 per cent increase among “children of school age” 
which at the time referred to children between the ages of six and fourteen; however, 
Germany only raised the mandatory school-going age from twelve to fourteen in 1918 
so it may also refer to the ages of six to twelve. See, Ibid, 73. 
55  Hall, The War on Sea, 1914-1918, 73. 
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Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler’s The Cost of the World War to 
Germany and to Austria-Hungary provides an  even more graphic 
description of Germany’s coal-starved decline as the Germen 
government sought to intervene in 1916:
Coal rations were reduced, where possible. On the whole, however, the 
growing list of industries “essential” to the conduct of the war made 
discrimination ever more difficult. The discrimination finally was not 
between essential war purposes and non-essential uses, but between 
different war purposes; thus it became more and more arbitrary, and 
increasing shortages enforced restrictions to the detriment even of war 
production and of military operations.56
Some of these shortages include a cotton industry in which only 
4 per cent of the 1,700 spinning and weaving mills were able to 
continue operating in 1918.57 Even central war industries like the 
manufacturing of boots and footwear only produced from about 
half of their production sites by 1917. Three-quarters of German 
oil mills were forced to close by 1917. For men like the escaping 
British POW, the closure of 85 per cent of Germany’s prewar soap 
production plants—causing soap shortages nationwide—had been a 
godsend, allowing him to purchase clothing, compasses and a map. 
Even Germany’s world-renowned breweries were not immune. Of 
the 3,786 breweries in 1913, less than half were still operational in 
1918.58 Coal shortages consistently hampered these faltering German 
industries.59
A letter from Ethel Cooper, a British woman remaining in 
Germany, dated 4 February, 1917, provides further proof of such 
shortages:
Coal has run out. The electric light is cut off in most houses (I have gas, 
thank Heaven!), the trams are not running, or only in the very early 
morning, all theatres, schools, the opera, Gewandhaus and concerts 
and cinematographs are closed—neither potatoes nor turnips are to be 
56  Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-
Hungary, 56. 
57  Ibid, 57. 
58  Ibid, 57. 
59  Of the original 3,786 breweries only 2,192 were still working in 1917 and 1,833, less 
than half of their prewar numbers, were still operational in 1918.” Ibid, 58. 
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had—they were our last resource—there is no fish—and Germany has 
at last ceased to trumpet the fact that it can’t be starved out. Added 
to that the thermometer outside my kitchen window says 24 deg. Fahr. 
below zero. I have never seen that before.60
Coal was the fuel of industry, transportation (both land and sea), 
power, light and heat. Coal impacted all aspects of the war. Power 
generators, urban gas works, and the mechanised hammers and 
forges of industry were all supposed to save on manpower and sustain 
themselves, but without coal even those functions were suppressed. 
A British intelligence summary from  1918 detailed the deprivation 
and suffering  in Germany because of the coal shortage:
With the advent of winter the coal shortage has assumed a still more 
serious aspect. Factories in all parts of Germany are greatly hampered 
by the lack of coal, and many works have been forced to restrict their 
output[...]There are daily queues of men and women […] in front of 
the coal-dealers’ shops in Berlin, but so small are the stocks in hand 
that they frequently have to go away without any coal after hours of 
waiting. Dusseldorf, though on the Rhine and within easy reach of the 
coal-fields, appears to have been particularly badly off for coal and 
throughout South Germany, and especially in Bavaria, complaints are 
heard of inadequate coal supplies and of unfair treatment at the hands 
of the Imperial Coal Commissary...61
The report was part of a monthly series which in this case examined 
the cause of the coal shortage, implicating problems of transportation 
because of a shortage of trucks.62 It set out Germany’s response 
to the coal shortage, describing attempts to ration consumption 
and supplies of coal. It explained measures taken in large towns 
and cities, including Berlin, Munich, and Dusseldorf to control fuel 
and gas consumption such as special tickets issued for washing and 
cooking, limited heating of schools in Berlin, and early closing work 
hours. Moreover, the report showed that there were reductions in 
60  Cooper and Denholm, Behind the lines: one women’s war, 1914-1918: the letters 
of Caroline Ethel Cooper, 144. 
61  The Economic Situation in Germany in November 1917, Being the Fortieth 
Month of the War. Mr. Max Muller to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst: British National 
Archives: CO 323/775, General 1918. 180-182
62  Ibid, 181.
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fuel use in “factories necessary for war purposes” where a 20 per cent 
reduction was required.63 It further explained:
Further evidence of the shortage of coal in Germany is afforded by the 
falling off in the export, in spite of the fact that Germany is, under various 
commercial agreements, committed to a certain exportation of coal to 
neighbouring neutral countries[...]The present export to Switzerland, 
Denmark, and Holland taken together are said to average less than 
500,000 tons a month. The German coal delivered to Switzerland in 
November is not expected to exceed 120,000 to 130,000 tons, instead of 
the promised 200,000 tons[…]64
The report offered various explanations for the shortage and 
reiterated the distress of the German people who suffered because 
of it:
The fact, however, is abundantly clear that coal is really scarce, probably 
scarcer than ever before during the war; and whether this situation is 
due to transport difficulties or coal export agreements, or reductions of 
output due to the growing inefficiency of the miners caused by the poor 
quality of their nourishment, is of secondary importance, so long as the 
inconveniences and distress inseparable from a shortage of fuel continue 
to afflict the German people.65
This central message of Germany’s distress and growing paralysis 
because of lack of fuel and supplies was repeated in many reports, 
documents and accounts.66
By the beginning of 1918, Germany was forced to renege on 
several of its coal supply contracts with Sweden, Austria-Hungary 
and Denmark. Germany was the only major supplier of high quality 
coal still able to function in mainland Europe and, because of 
Britain’s suppression of coal trade to these countries, Germany was 
forced to substitute its own coal to fuel the neutral commerce it 
so desperately needed. While this depleted coal reserves desperately 
needed at home, it was the only way to maintain even a tenuous 
63  Ibid, 182.
64  Ibid, 182.
65  Ibid, 182.
66  British National Archives: CO 323 designation in entirety
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link to the many supplies required to sustain its wartime activities.67 
Germany’s eventual inability to sustain that commerce, despite its 
desperate need for supplies from abroad, certainly signified that its 
end was near.
The centrality of the coal industry to the German war effort is 
indicated by the state of collapse in which it found itself at war’s end.68 
Near the end of the war, German industry was generally working at 
about 40 per cent of its prewar efficiency, requiring between two 
to three times the manpower to accomplish the same tasks.69 The 
exhaustive investigation performed by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace concluded that little of Germany’s industry 
remained salvageable in the postwar environment:
The adjustment of industrial equipment to war production and to the 
manufacture of substitutes could not fail to depreciate machinery by 
change of installations and of machinery parts, and by greater wear 
and tear; frequently complete technical reorganization was required. 
In the less active industries such as the textile industries, plants 
deteriorated because they were not used and could not be properly 
maintained. In other cases, machinery was transferred from the less to 
the more essential industries, especially under the Hindenburg Program 
(Maschinen-Ausgleich), with resulting dilapidation of equipment in the 
less essential industries.70
The study even documented how this industrial overuse and decay 
proved especially dire to the coal mining industry on which so much 
of the German economy industry relied.
‘During the War the [coal] mines, while suffering from lack of material 
as well as labor, had to produce the highest possible output. Any thought 
for the future had to be set aside; the machinery was all worn to the 
67  Archibald Colquhoun Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the 
Countries Associated with Her in the Great War: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey,  1914-1918 (London: H.M Stationary Office, 1937), 351.
68  Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-
Hungary, 34.
69  Ibid, 27, 30, 33.
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outmost limit.’71 As a result of wear and tear, the coal requirements 
of the mines themselves became larger and larger until they were six 
million tons more in 1921 than in 1913.72
How did Britain’s mastery of coal and international access relate 
to this situation? In a direct sense, Britain’s control over massive 
quantities of the highest quality coals, its geographic accessibility to 
the sea, as well as its well-developed distribution network worldwide 
made it an ideal prewar German trading partner. Prior to the war, 
many of Germany’s high-tech industries had been almost entirely 
reliant on British-Welsh anthracite because the best German coal 
had already been reserved for the government and its war industries.73 
There had never been enough German high-quality coal to supply all 
of Germany’s needs. Despite Germany’s wartime efforts to expand 
production using the mines of conquered territories and the massive 
use of prisoners of war as slave labor, these shortages were simply 
never made up. There are those who place the number of German 
civilian deaths as a result of Britain’s blockade at around 760,000 and 
others who place that figure far higher, but a reasonable conclusion 
is that in many cases food might have been available had there been 
the fuel to transport it.74
Coal remained a defining resource of limitation throughout the 
World War I. Because of Britain’s near monopoly over steamship 
coal and refueling stations, the Triple Entente was supplied with the 
71  Quoted as being from G. Luebsen, “The German Coal Situation,” in Reconstruction 
in Europe, ed. by the Manchester Guardian Commercial, 1922.
72  Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-
Hungary, 40.
73  Anthracite has occasionally also been used as a term referencing high efficiency 
steaming coal, such as within the author’s own previous article,  Joseph Zeller, 
“British Maritime Coal and Commercial Control in the First World War: Far More 
Than Mere Blockade,” Canadian Military History 24, 2 (2015): 37-57 and historical 
sources such as British National Archives: CAB 17/4 ‘Anthracite Coal Supplies for 
the Navy 1904-1905, and ‘On the Anthracite Coal and Coal-field of South Wales’ 
by C. H. Perkins. British Association for the Advancement of Science. Report of 
the Annual Meeting (Office of the British Association, 1880), 220-21.  However, the 
author is grateful to Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal Australia Navy (ret) for 
directing him to current practice which views quality smokeless steaming coal as 
being closer to mid-quality semi bituminous coals and views it as entirely distinct 
from the anthracite veins around which it is generally obtained.
74  C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-
1919 (Athens:  Ohio University Press, 1985), 170.
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soldiers and materials needed to maintain its strength. Britain used 
its chain of coaling stations and control over the fuel of commerce 
to redirect supplies from across the world to support the British 
war effort until Germany stood increasingly alone. Denied access to 
the global marketplace, Germany was forced to subsist on dwindling 
reserves of materials. Lack of coal meant that Germany was unable to 
respond domestically to those restrictions because without the much-
needed fuel, it was unable make up the necessary materials, industry 
and infrastructure in both military and domestic realms. Germany’s 
opportunity to win the war suffered as its foreign commerce was 
eliminated and its people devastated.
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